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1. Introduction 
It has become commonplace to say that knowledge is the most important resource in modern 
economies. Estimates of national wealth often end up with a share of total wealth due to human capital 
in the order of two-thirds or three-quarters of total wealth. Knowledge is accumulated through 
learning. In the learning economy the core processes are related to producing, distributing and using 
knowledge according to OECD (1996a). The knowledge based economy means “..economies which 
are directly based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information. This is 
reflected in the trend in OECD economies towards growth in high-technology investments, high-
technology industries, more highly-skilled labour and associated productivity gains.” (OECD (1996a), 
pp. 229). 
 
This paper addresses the relationship between knowledge and learning and the income distribution in 
the OECD-countries since 1980. Why do we expect any relationship between learning and income 
distribution? One simple microeconomic reason could be that people with more skills or knowledge 
are better paid than the average worker. When there is skill upgrading in a country this may lead to a 
more unequal distribution. However, this will only be the case if there is increased demand for these 
skills. If not, the skill premium may fall and the income distribution may in fact become more equal. 
Another reason is the classical argument put forward by Kuznets (1955). An increase in economic 
growth is often caused by structural change in the economy with a new sector growing much more 
rapidly than the economy as a whole. The growth of the ITC sector is a recent example. As a 
consequence demand for certain skills increases rapidly and so will the wages paid for these skills by 
the new sector. Initially this increases dispersion of wages. However, as supply of these skills 
increases and a much larger share of the labour force is employed by the new sector often at the net 
expense of more traditional sectors, inequality may fall. Thus initially growth goes hand in hand with 
more inequality while a in more mature stage growth and equality is taking place at the same time. 
This is one explanation behind the traditional Kuznets curve that depicts an inverted U-shaped curve 
between the income level and inequality. 
 
As indicated by the quotation from OECD above, OECD-countries (as well as many non-OECD-
countries) are characterized by more investments in high-tech goods and software than a few decades 
ago. This has led many observers to talk about a “new economy”. Furthermore, OECD-countries have 
deregulated both product and labour markets during the last two decades or have been subject to 
structural reforms. In addition many markets are subject to globalization that has affected factor prices. 
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Thus skills may become obsolete or at least the market remuneration of these skills may be influenced 
by more competition in both factor and product markets. So although the growth of high-skilled labour 
is an important feature of most or all OECD-countries, this growth has taken place a long side a 
number of other important changes in these countries. Thus the combined effect on the income or 
wage distribution is far from easy to determine.  
 
The relation between learning and knowledge formally resembles how real investments accumulate 
into real capital in national accounting. However, learning is socially, geographically and 
institutionally embedded in more complicated ways than the “physical” accumulation of capital. 
Knowledge may according to Lam (2002) be seen as either individualized or collective and either as 
explicit or tacit. Thus learning is not only an individual activity but also an activity that takes place at 
different institutional levels, within firms, bureaucracies and even at the various societal levels. 
Knowledge formation as well as knowledge remuneration varies with institutions. In economies such 
as the US and UK, cf. Whitley (2000) and Lam (2002), the labour market is characterised by high 
mobility and focus on private ownership of knowledge. Thus collective forms of knowledge focus on 
codified knowledge also because there is little cooperation between firms. In economies where there is 
broad-based public education and training and more focus on public private partnership as well as 
stronger firm linkages and strong unions, tacit knowledge is more common. Finally in economies 
where the state is more important and labour markets are dominated by large corporations and long-
term employment contracts (Japan), knowledge is mobilized again mainly in firm-specific tacit forms. 
The way knowledge is institutionally embedded and how labour markets are organized in different 
economies, may thus affect earnings and income equality. 
 
In the following section I present up-dated empirical evidence on changes in the distribution of income 
and wages in many OECD-countries. Next, a simple model of the labour market is presented and used 
to organize the discussion of factors that may influence wage dispersion. Then I refer to a number of 
studies that have presented different interpretation of these empirical features before I conclude. 
2. Trends in earnings inequality among OECD-countries 
There is by now a vast literature on the distribution of earnings as well as the wider question of 
income inequality among OECD-countries. cf. Gottshcalk and Smeeding (1997), Förster and Pearson 
(2002), Atkinson (1999) to mention just a few. The literature on growth theory as well as empirical 
growth studies are also concerned with the relationship between growth and inequality, cf. Aghion et 
al. (1999) for a survey. In this section I will draw on these studies and others to present the highly 
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diverse historical experience of various OECD-countries when it comes to their distribution of income 
and more narrowly the earnings distribution. 
 
When analysing distribution of income there are many important data issues that need to be taken into 
account before comparison between countries or even within countries over time can be made with 
some reliability. Let me briefly address some of these issues. In Förster and Pearson (2002) income is 
measured as total disposable income mainly by using income statistics for tax purposes at the 
household level and they also adjust for household size by using equivalence scales. This is useful for 
some purposes but I argue not necessarily for the purpose of studying the relationship between 
learning and inequality. Economic and social changes will influence how households are formed and 
dissolved but these changes vary much between countries and over time and may have little to do with 
learning, earnings and productivity. The number of children will also affect this measure of 
distribution. Inequality may increase or decrease due to changes in the tax system (say taxation of 
capital income) or transfers that are not linked to learning. Inequality may be affected by working 
hours by adult household members that have to do with factors unrelated to how learning and 
knowledge is remunerated. 
 
Similarly if one chooses to study earnings inequality a number of data issues are worth considering 
before making any comparison between countries. Are we to use annual or weekly earning that are 
affected by working time that may change between countries and over time? If we use annual earnings 
should we focus only on full time workers in order to avoid too large influence of differences in 
working hours and how do we make this adjustment consistent between countries? Would it be best to 
focus on hourly wage rates since these are what workers face as parameters when they decide how 
much labour to supply? Perhaps there are restrictions or barriers to “pure” labour supply decisions that 
we should take into account? I shall not try to answer these questions here, but they are forwarded 
simply to make us aware of some difficult data issues that need to be dealt with in order to make 
comparisons between countries and over time as I do in this paper.   
 
An alternative to a pure statistical exercise is instead to estimate individual wage equations (Mincer-
equations) that explicitly try to measure how education, work experience and other factors closely 
linked to knowledge are rewarded in the economy. If say the educational premium (How much does 
the wage rate increase if you spend one more year in formal education?) increases over time, are we 
then to conclude that knowledge is rewarded more generously than before? What if there is a 
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simultaneous decline in the experience reward (How much more are you paid if you work another 
year?) so that on the job training or “learning by doing” is less rewarded?  
 
There is no agreed upon method or best practice available when studying income distribution. The 
purpose of each study and sometimes simply data availability will to a large extent determine which 
method that is most relevant or simply available. I will begin discussing changes in the distribution of 
income in general and not earnings specifically because the distribution of disposable income is 
perhaps more relevant for discussions of social cohesion than focusing solely on the earnings 
distribution that more easily can be related to differences in skills and learning. 
Household distribution of disposable income 
A number of studies have discussed changes in the distribution of income within OECD-countries 
over time as well as between these countries at any time. There are a number of various measures 
available as mentioned earlier, but I shall focus on the Gini-coefficient as supplied by the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) in February 2004. The advantage of using these figures is that they have been 
compiled and adjusted in order to make them more suitable for comparisons between countries and 
over time. I focus on the period from around 1980 and as far as recent figures go. It is generally 
accepted that during the 1970s there were tendencies in most countries for income inequality to 
decline or at least be stable. Even in a country like the US where inequality has increased in recent 
decades, inequality decreased or was fairly stable during the 1970s. This seems to have changed in 
recent decades and many observers relate this change to those factors that the OECD suggests 
characterize the learning economy.  
 
The main trends are shown in figures 1a, 1b and 1c. The LIS figures are for various years and not 
continuous and in the figures and I have simply interpolated. As is evident from the figures there are 
no common trends in inequality between countries over time. Many countries have a rather stable 
income distribution while in some countries there is increasing inequality. We do not observe a 
downward trend in inequality for any country.  
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Fig. 1b. Income Inequality. Gini Coefficient 
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Fig. 1a.  Income Inequality. Gini Coefficient 
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Let me comment briefly on the development in each country. In Australia there is a steady increase in 
inequality. Percentile ratios (also supplied by LIS but not reported here) show that it is mainly in the 
lower part of the distribution that has become more unequal. In Canada the distribution of income is 
fairly stable but with a higher degree of inequality during the second half of the 1990s. As for 
Australia, it is the lower part of the distribution that has changed. In the United States increased 
inequality took place in the first half of the 1980s and during the first half of the 1990s with a large 
increase at the lower part of the distribution in the early 1980s but with small changes thereafter. In the 
United Kingdom increased inequality took place during the whole of the 1980s but not much change 
thereafter. There was a large increase in inequality at the lower part of the distribution.  For Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and Norway the distribution of income 
has been quite stable. In Finland we observe a fairly stable income distribution but with some sign of 
increased inequality recently. Finally in Sweden there has been an increase in inequality in particular 
during the latter half of the 1990s.  
 
To sum up, there are quite diverse country experiences when it comes to changes in the distribution of 
income. Clearly some Anglo-Saxon countries have experienced some marked increases in inequality, 
while continental Europe has not, or at least the increase in inequality began much later. In most 
Anglo-Saxon countries the level of inequality is also greater than in most other European countries. 
 
Fig. 1c. Income Inequality. Gini Coefficient 
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These “facts” are well known to students of income distribution and is reported by Gottschalk and 
Smeeding (1997). In the OECD-study by Föster and Pearson (2002), also using comparable data from 
different countries, they conclude that the tendency for a more polarized distribution within each 
country started in the Anglo-Saxon countries in 1980s and was followed by a similar tendency in 
many continental European countries in the 1990s. 
 
The empirical studies referred to above also show that market incomes have become more unequally 
distributed. In spite of the fact that government transfers and taxation contribute more towards equality 
than before (again as a general trend not as a feature of all OECD-countries) the change in the 
distribution of market incomes outweighs this phenomenon. The main contributor to this change is 
more unequal distribution of earnings across households according to Förster and Pearson (2002). 
They show that one important reason for this is what they call employment polarization; at the 
household level, total number of hours worked is more unequally distributed than before. There are 
more households where both adults work full time and fewer where only one adult work and there are 
also more households where both adults are workless. The high level of unemployment during the 
1980s and 1990s has clearly contributed to this polarization. However, we cannot infer that a more 
unequal distribution of household earnings implies a more unequal remuneration of skills. Let us 
therefore look at the distribution of wage rates in order better to assess the relationship between 
learning, wages and distribution. 
The distribution of wages 
OECD (1996b) presents data on the distribution of earnings for a large number of OECD-countries 
from around 1980 and until the early or mid 1990s. The data are presented as the ratio of the earnings 
level of the upper 9th decile (D9) to the median and the ratio between the median and the lower level of 
the 1st decile (D1). The data are for full time workers and presented for male and female workers 
separately. In order to simplify, I shall concentrate on the total D9/D1 ratio in this paper. The OECD-
figures show a strong trend toward greater inequality of wages in the UK and US, but not in other 
countries. The increase in earnings dispersion in these two countries applies to both sexes as well as to 
the upper and lower part of the distribution, so it is pervasive.  
 
The increase in wage inequality in the US has been the subject of a number of studies reviewed by 
Gottschalk and Smeeding  (1997) and others. In order to narrow down possible sources of increased 
inequality many studies have focused on male earnings for full-time workers. The standard findings in 
this literature are that there was a large increase in returns to education in the US during the 1980s as 
well as an increase in returns to experience. Finally there was also an increase in wage inequality 
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within specific groups even after adjusting for education and experience. All these findings seem to 
indicate that the remuneration of formal learning and on the job training as well as unobserved 
personal characteristics have increased and thus contributed to increased dispersion of wages. 
 
According to Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) only the UK experienced an increase in wage 
inequality similar to that of the US among OECD-countries. Both Canada and Australia showed a 
clear tendency toward higher wage inequality but less than in the US and UK while France, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Sweden and Finland formed a group of countries with quite small increases in inequality 
that also started a bit later than in the other countries. Only Germany and Italy showed no increase in 
inequality according to this summary of many studies of wage inequality. Among these countries, only 
Sweden and the UK showed a clear tendency for the wage distribution to become more unequal due to 
returns to education. Returns to experience produced more inequality in Australia, Canada, France, 
The Netherlands and the UK. Finally within group inequality increased in Australia, Canada, Sweden 
and the UK. 
 
All in all there seemed to be a consensus in the literature based on evidence from the 1980s and early 
1990s that wage inequality had increased substantially in Anglo-Saxon countries based on increased 
wage premium for education and experience as well as within group inequality. For many other OECD 
countries tendencies were not so clear. But no country shows systematic signs of less wage inequality, 
as was the case in several countries during the 1970s. In this respect the evidence on wage inequality 
is quite similar to that on income inequality based on household disposable income as referred to 
earlier. I shall discuss the possible causes of the increase in wage inequality later.  
 
It is more difficult to establish what has happen to recent developments in wage dispersion because 
there is no comprehensive single database that is up to date on this issue. What I have done is to up-
date the figures in Table 3.1. in OECD (1996b) as far as other sources are available mainly by linking 
or calibrating more recent data to the OECD data in order to avoid any breaks. The main source of 
information is an up-dated version of the OECD earnings database that has data until 2001 for some 
countries. Additional sources are Atkinson (1999), Phelps (2000) and Barrett et al. (2000). As far as 
these data go, they indicate that the qualitative features found by Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) are 
somewhat modified.  
 
According to recent data (the ratio between upper earnings limit of the 9th and 1th decile) shown on 
figure 2a there is still some increase in wage dispersion going on in the US, but the increase in the 
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dispersion during the 1990s is much less than during the 1980s. For the UK there is hardly any 
increase in wage inequality at all during the 1990s. While the wage dispersion in Australia did not 
change much until the mid 1990s there is an increase in inequality during the latter half of this decade. 
Wage dispersion is clearly falling in Japan and Canada during the 1990s after having increased 
somewhat during the 1980s. In South Korea the large decrease in wage inequality during the latter half 
of the 1980s seems to have come to a halt in the 1990s. So the two East-Asian countries have if 
anything, enjoyed stable or even a more equal distribution of wages since the early 1980s. The 
experience of the Anglo-Saxon countries is more varied and it seems difficult to claim they follow 
similar patterns of development. The US development is in fact an outlier both in terms of the level of 
inequality and its trend. 
 
Moving to continental Europe cf. Figure 2b, wage dispersion in France is quite stable or has been 
slightly reduced during the latter half of the 1990s. Also in Germany the wage distribution is quite 
stable if we do not regard the last observation as indicating a change in development. The same goes 
for Austria while the Italian development is hard to interpret with a large decrease in wage inequality 
during the 1980s and a similar but more rapid increase in the early 1990s. The wage dispersion in the 
Netherlands was quite stable from the mid 1980s to mid 1990s cf. Figure 2c, but there is a jump from 
1994 to 1995 that may be due data problems (linking various sources) but could otherwise be 
interpreted to indicate an increase in wage dispersion during the 1990s.   
 
Developments in some Nordic countries are shown in Figure 2c. Finland is an interesting case from 
the perspective of the “new economy” because the country is relatively intensive in terms of 
development and production of ITC-goods. Here if anything, wage inequality has fallen during the 
1990s; a decade that most observers regard as the hey-days of globalization and ITC-driven 
technological change. Norway has hardly experienced any change in wage dispersion during the last 
two decades. In Sweden on the other hand, there has clearly been a moderate increase in inequality for 
some time. By international standards dispersion is still very low in all Nordic countries. There are no 
data for Denmark for the 1990s but wage dispersion during the 1980s was similar to that of Sweden 
and Norway. 
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Figure 2a. Earnings in equality. The ratio D9/D1
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Figure 2b. Earnings in equality. The ratio D9/D1
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For the US, the UK and Sweden inequality is on the increase both at the top and lower end of the 
distribution. In Australia there has been a compression of the wage distribution in the low-income end 
but an increase at the top. This tendency of less inequality at the lower end of the distribution but more 
inequality at the upper end is apparent in many countries such as Finland, Germany and Japan. For 
France and Austria the decline in dispersion is mainly due to lower inequality at the lower end of the 
earnings distribution.  
 
According to the OECD earnings database a more detailed investigation of different parts of the 
earnings distribution suggests that the experience of various countries is quite varied and no consistent 
pattern emerges. Thus the impression that emerges from figures 2a-2c of no common trend in the 
earnings distribution is even more pronounced when looking at the distribution in more detail. I now 
turn to the question of how to interpret this diverse picture.  
3. The skill premium in a model with imperfect labour markets 
In this section I present a simple and partial model of the labour market in order to structure my 
discussion of factors that may explain the changes in wage dispersion presented above.    
Figure 2c. Earnings in equality. The ratio D9/D1
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Assume that demand for skilled labour (Ns) relative to unskilled labour (Nus) depends negatively on 
relative wages for these two groups (Ws/Wus) and positively on technical change represented by a shift 
variable (t)  
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By definition employment equals labour supply (S) minus unemployment (U), hence relative 
employment may be written as  
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where the u's are unemployment rates. Combining equations (1) and (2) and defining s as the share of 
skilled labour in the total labour force, we have: 
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According to equation (3) a positive shift in t due to technical change that result in more demand for 
skilled workers at the expense of unskilled (so-called skill biased technical change or SBTC hereafter), 
the skill premium will have to increase if relative unemployment is to be constant unless there is an 
increase in the share of skilled persons in the labour force denoted by s in (3). Note that it is relative 
unemployment rates and not their absolute difference in percent that matters for this result according 
to the model. 
 
Assume further that wage formation can be described by wage curves, cf. Layard et al. (1991) for each 
skill category 
 
(4) ( ) ,0',',, 21 <= sssss gguugQPW   
(5) ( ) ,0',',, 21 <= ususususus gguugQPW  
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where su  and usu  are the skill-specific unemployment rates and where u is the average unemployment 
rate, P is producer price and Q is average labour productivity by sector. Thus the wage equations state 
that in the long run the labour share of value added depends negatively on both skill-specific and 
average unemployment. The wage curve representation encompasses several theories on wage 
setting1. Solving for relative wage rates, and assuming that the effects of the average unemployment 
rate are the same for both skill-groups, cf. Bjørnstad et al. (2002) yields 
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According to (6) there is a negative relationship between relative wages and relative unemployment 
rates for skill-groups. If wages are affected by education-specific unemployment rates, the skill 
premium adjusts to skill mismatch. However, if there is no such effect, skill mismatch is likely to 
prevail, at least until supply adjusts accordingly. The exact degree of labour market flexibility depends 
on the parameters, the substitution possibilities and the price elasticities. Notice also that demand 
shifts, such as SBTC, affect wage inequality only through skill mismatch in the long run in this model. 
This assumption is plausible when the labour force is endogenous. Layard et al. (1991, chapter 6) 
show that only supply-side factors, such as costs of attaining education, affect relative wages and 
unemployment. In steady state, the skill premium is equal to the cost of attaining that skill.  
 
                                                     
1 Competitive labour market, bargaining between labour unions and firms, and efficiency wages, see Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994). 
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Figure 3: Determination of relative wages and unemployment rates 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the determination of relative wages and relative unemployment according to 
equations (3) and (6). Skill biased technical change (SBTC) will shift the demand curve for labour 
implying an upward shift in the curve marked Equation (3) to a higher skill premium and lower 
unemployment rate for skilled persons. A relative increase in the share of skilled persons in the labour 
force (increase in s in Equation (3)) results in a downward shift in (3) and leads to lower skill premium 
and higher relative unemployment for skilled persons. We can also interpret the shift parameter as 
indicating what happens if there is a change in the structure of demand by skills due to changes in 
industry structure. If one industry uses relatively more unskilled labour and experience a negative 
shock of some kind, the relative demand for unskilled will decline even for a given level of relative 
wages. Through market forces this will change both relative wages and unemployment rates. 
According to this model, a more skilled labour force will reduce the wage premium for the skilled. 
Thus learning as such is negatively related to wage inequality. Only when the change in demand for 
skills due to say technological change is increasing faster than the upgrading of the labour force, will 
relative wages for skilled workers increase. 
 
According to equations (3) and (6) relative unemployment rates for skilled and unskilled as well as 
relative wage rates are both determined by the skill composition of the labour force (s) and the shift 
parameter for technological change (t). It is fairly straight-forward to show that this shift parameter 
Equation (3)
Equation (6)
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also can be interpreted to capture changes in international trade and as such pick up changes in relative 
product prices due to say increased competition from low income countries. In this case we may think 
of the unskilled employed mainly in one sector and the skilled in another. The standard interpretation 
is on the other hand that in the macrosector both types of labour are employed and there is substitution 
between them. I stick to the technological change interpretation as this is by and large considered to be 
the most relevant explanation for wage dispersion. This is due to the fact that changes in the skill 
composition seems to have taken place in nearly all sectors of the economy so it can be interpreted as 
a common shock to all sectors and not as a sector-specific shock.  
 
If we focus on the technological change explanation as the most relevant one for why wage dispersion 
has increased in some but not all countries cf. figures 2a-2c, how can the model presented be helpful? 
First of all, I argue that it is reasonable to regard SBTC as a common shock to all countries studied 
here. The degree of the shock varies somewhat between countries due to the fact that some countries 
have a large ITC sector producing capital goods while other countries mainly import and use these 
goods in production. According to the model presented earlier, only changes in the skill structure of 
the population may offset the effects of SBTC. Consequently in those countries where a parallel 
upgrading of skills has taken place alongside changes in technology we should expect to see less 
inequality. So what do we know about changes in the skill structure in the countries included in the 
figures earlier? 
 
In Table 1 I show the share of the population between 25-64 years that has attained the highest type of 
education (tertiary) for some of the countries discussed earlier. For other countries included in figures 
2a-2c, no comparable figures were found for a sufficiently long period so they are not included here. 
The figures in the table show very large differences in educational levels by country with the US 
ranking highest, but with Norway catching up during the 1990s. Also Canada has a high level and both 
Australia and the UK rapidly increased their levels of education during the 1990s too. Many EU-
countries have fairly low levels of their population between 25-64 years with tertiary education 
according to the OECD. Both Germany and Belgium (not included in the table because of lack of 
consistent data) have relatively low levels in 2001, while the Netherlands are similar to Canada.   
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Table 1. Share of population in percent that has attained tertiary (type A) education 
 1981 1989 1994 1998 2001 
Australia missing 10 14 17 19 
Canada 12 15 17 18 20 
UK   81   9 12 16 18 
US 22 24 25 27 28 
Austria missing   6   5   6   7 
France   7   7   9 11 12 
Italy missing   6   8   9 10 
Finland   82 10 11 13 15 
Norway   7 11 17 243 28 
Sweden 11 13 13 13 17 
1 1984.  2 1982.  31997. 
Sources: OECD (2003), OECD (2000), OECD (1997).  
 
According to the model presented earlier, it is the change in the education level that is relevant in 
“explaining” changes in the wage distribution. The levels of education will be reflected in the industry 
structure of countries and are as such part of the comparative advantage created by countries, although 
it may of course affect both the size of the change and the level of wage dispersion. Let us, therefore, 
relate changes in education levels to what has happened to changes in wage dispersion taking as our 
basic starting point SBTC in all countries. In Australia there has been a large increase in the share of 
the population with high education thus possibly counteracting SBTC. Australia has no large change 
in wage dispersion. Also Canada has increased its educational level although not by as much as 
Australia. It is hard to relate changes in wage dispersion in Canada to the upgrading of skill according 
to Table 1. For the UK the increase in education was moderate during the 1980's and wage dispersion 
increased while there was less increase in dispersion during the 1990's when educational levels 
increased more rapidly which fits well with the partial model presented earlier. For the US there was 
also less increase in share of the population with the highest education during the 1980's than during 
the 1990s, again in line with how the model would predict a larger increase in dispersion in the 1980's 
than later given a constant rate of SBTC. For Austria there is little change in dispersion as well as in 
education, which is not in line with what you would expect in light of SBTC. For France the increase 
in the educational level is moderate and the decline in dispersion is accordingly unexplained. The 
increase in dispersion in Italy during the 1990's may partly be explained by the lack of increase in 
educational level. In Finland there has been a large increase in the level of education although from a 
fairly low level in line with slightly falling wage dispersion. For Norway there has been a dramatic 
increase in educational levels and no increase in dispersion. One would nearly have expected a decline 
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in dispersion given this change in educational levels. For Sweden the increase in dispersion could be 
explained by a fairly modest increase in higher education. Thus taking all countries together the 
figures in Table 1 seem to indicate some relevance of the model presented in that countries with 
substantial upgrading of their educational level, have experienced less increase in wage dispersion and 
even a decline. But there are deviations from this story so there is obviously a need for refining of our 
argument.  
 
It has been argued by Krugman (1994) and others that in many European countries the unskilled have 
been made unemployed by rigid wage bargaining institutions due to skilled bias technical change 
while in the US this shock has been absorbed by changes in relative factor prices (or wages). Figure 4 
shows that there is no such simple relationship present in aggregate data for the countries I study. On 
the vertical axes the wage dispersion (D9/D1) in the last year available according to figures 2a-2c is 
shown and on the horizontal axes the ratio us/uus in 2001 according to OECD (2003). There is no 
strong correlation between wage dispersion and relative unemployment rates for skilled and unskilled. 
If anything there is a tendency for more dispersion in wages in countries with large relative differences 
in unemployment. Even if we change the figure by using the difference and not the ratio of 
unemployment rates, the no strong correlation story holds. This is also the case if we use total 
unemployment; there is simply no strong correlation between dispersion and unemployment between 
countries.   
 
Figure  4. Wage dispersion and re lative  unemployment rates
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So far I have not referred to changes in institutional factors that may influence the bargaining position 
of the parties involved in wage negotiations. These variables are in fact suppressed in the wage 
equations (4) and (5) and affect the location of equation (6) in Figure 3 and thus relative wages. 
According to the literature on wage determination and wage inequality cf. Blau and Kahn (1996), 
Nunziata (2001) and Wallerstein (1999) institutional variables that affect the outcome of bargaining 
are trade union bargaining power and the degree of coordination in wage bargaining. Trade union 
bargaining power is related to 
• the proportion of employees covered by collective agreements and union membership 
• labour market regulation and employment protection  
• unemployment benefits or the benefit replacement rate that affects “outside options” 
• the minimum wage that can act as a floor to wage bargaining 
 
The degree of coordination in wage bargaining is related to a number of institutional factors among 
which the degree of centralization of wage bargaining is found to be of great significance. Here one 
distinction is between systems where wages are largely negotiated at the plant level (the US, Canada, 
the UK) while in many European countries wages are often negotiated at the industry level. The 
Nordic countries and the Netherlands (since the 1982 Wassenaar agreement) have traditionally had 
significant additional national coordination and periodically direct governmental interference at the 
macrolevel, cf. Wallerstein (1999). Interestingly EU-countries with a relatively high degree of 
coordination in wage bargaining also belong to the group of countries with a relatively high share of 
so-called learning organizations, cf. the chapter by Lorenz and Valeyre in this volume. Several 
estimates of wage bargaining coordination exist in the literature and it not obvious how one best 
should measure an institutional factor. I have chosen a measure of coordination developed by 
Wallerstein (1999) that applies to most countries in my sample. If we relate this qualitative variable to 
wage dispersion in the same way as in Figure 4, we get a picture of a possible link between 
coordination and dispersion as in Figure 5 below. From this figure we clearly see a negative relation 
between wage dispersion and the degree of coordination in wage bargaining.  The US and Canada 
have hardly any coordination in wage bargaining and large wage dispersion while in the Scandinavian 
countries on the other hand there is much more coordination and less dispersion.  
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Let me now try to explain changes in dispersion using changes in those institutional factors affecting 
wage bargaining that I listed above and data supplied in Nunziata (2001). For the US there has been 
little changes in coordination. However, the unemployment benefits replacement rate (BRR) was 
reduced somewhat during the 1980s (but not the 1990s) and union density (UD) declined during the 
1980s but stabilized later. Also the minimum wage declined markedly during the 1980s; a fact we 
shall return to in the next section. Thus there are some changes in institutions that may explain the 
increase in dispersion during the 1980s for the US. Noticeably, these factors changed much less during 
the 1990s when also dispersion was more stable. A similar story can really be told for the UK where 
also wage coordination measured by the proportion of employees covered by collective agreements 
declined during 1980s. Thus here there are strong reasons to believe that institutional changes have 
lead to increased dispersion in the UK. For Australia the degree of coordination was reduced during 
the first half of the 1990s. That fits well with the moderate increase in dispersion that we observe in 
Figure 2a from 1993 and onwards. For Canada there are few changes in institutions except for the 
minimum wage that relative to average earnings has developed just inversely to dispersion; falling 
markedly from the late 1970s until 1986 and increasing thereafter. This is very much the opposite of 
what to expect when looking at the earnings inequality according to Figure 2a. For Japan there are 
hardly any changes in the institutional factors and inequality.  
 
Figure  5. Wage dispersion and bargaining coordination
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For France the institutional variables show a diverse picture. The benefit replacement rate (BRR) has 
declined along with union density (UD) but coordination has increased somewhat. From Figure 2b we 
see that dispersion has not changed much. For Germany BRR was reduced recently along with UD. 
This should lead to more inequality and that is what we observe during the second half of the 1990s, 
but changes are small. For Austria there are in general small changes. For Italy the institutional 
indicators point in different directions. According to Wallerstein (1999) coordination has been reduced 
recently and this may explain the large increase in dispersion during the early 1990s.  
 
In Finland both BRR and UD has increased and this may explain the slight reduction in dispersion 
according to Figure 2c. For Norway institutional factors have been quite stable and there is hardly any 
change in dispersion. In Sweden wage coordination has been reduced and this might explain the 
increase in dispersion. UD has on the other hand increased while BRR shows an inverted U-shape. For 
the Netherlands coordination has been stable, BRR has increased somewhat but here there is a strong 
decline in the minimum wage that may explain the upward trend in inequality. 
 
My summary of the country evidence is that changes in institutional variables seem to fit well with the 
observed changes in wage dispersion across countries. Thus it is a more likely candidate for explaining 
the diverse experience of the OECD countries when it comes to changes in wage dispersion than a 
common technological shock like skill biased technical change. In addition also changes in 
educational attainment help explain why some countries have been more successful in mitigating the 
effect of SBTC on wage dispersion. 
4. A closer look at some country studies  
Let me now refer to some recent published country studies that can add to our knowledge on wage 
dispersion and skills. Let me start with a recent study on the US where the debate on wage dispersion 
and the causes for its increase over time has been vivid for many years. Card and DiNardo (2003) 
argue against the current dominating view that skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is the most 
important factor that can explain the rising wage inequality in the US (and elsewhere). Using several 
sources of information and arguing for the use of hourly wage rates for all and not annual earnings for 
full time male workers, Card and DiNardo conclude that in the US it was only during the 1980s that 
wage dispersion increased and in particular in the early part of the 1980s. Looking at men and women 
separately, there is some tendency for wage dispersion to increase for women. Note that these data are 
not the same as those in the OECD earnings database that show a moderate increase in dispersion also 
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during the 1990s, cf. Figure 2a. So which wage measure to use, matters. This should of course make 
us more careful when concluding because it is far from obvious what to choose. 
 
Card and DiNardo (2003) also show that the education premium as measured by the college-high 
school wage ratio, has been quite stable during the 1990s. In particular for men there is hardly any 
change in the ratio while there was a large increase (more than 10 percentage points) during the 1980s 
and again mostly during the early stage of the decade. For women there was an increase during the 
1980s similar to that for men, but also an increase in the ratio during the 1990s, although only half of 
the absolute increase of the 1980s. The reason for the large increase in the education ratio for both 
men and women was that younger cohort of college educated persons increased their relative wages 
compared to others. During the 1990s there has been more stability in the dispersion also controlling 
for age. The education premium increased much during the 1980s in particular for younger people and 
this indicates that formal skills or knowledge was relatively better remunerated than before. However, 
this feature did not continue at least not at the same pace during the 1990s. Finally, looking at the 
residual in Mincer-type wage equations, i.e. after taking into account education, age (or experience) 
gender and race, the same pattern of changes in wage dispersion occurs, an increase in dispersion 
during the 1980s and little change thereafter. 
 
Having established these empirical features of the wage dispersion in the US (in addition to a number 
of other facts that we shall not consider here), Card and DiNardo (2003) argue quite convincingly that 
in order to explain the increase in dispersion in the 1980s but stability in the 1990s, it is in particular 
relevant to look at which of those factors that have been suggested as explanatory candidates survive 
when taking the features of both decades into account. They argue that SBTC is much less convincing 
as the main explanatory factor in the US because productivity change due to increased production and 
use of computers cannot have been slower during the 1990s than during the 1980s. In fact when 
looking at aggregate productivity figures for the US economy, there is no increase in productivity 
growth in the 1980s compared to the 1970s. However, such an increase in productivity growth took 
place during the 1990s, but then no widening wage dispersion occurred. Thus the timing of SBTC and 
aggregate productivity growth does not match and neither does the timing of SBTC and change in 
wage dispersion.  
 
What is then a reasonable explanation? According to Card and DiNardo (2003) reduced minimum 
wages is the “culprit” in particular because the timing fits well. Real minimum wages fell during most 
the 1980s and quite dramatically from 1979 to 1984 (by 33 %) but the fall continued during the whole 
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decade, while it changed little during the 1990s. A simple regression of the 90/10 wage-gap on the log 
of real minimum wages explains most of the changes in this dispersion from 1973 to 2000 according 
to the authors. There are other studies concluding in a similar vein, in particular DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996), Blau and Kahn (1996), Lee (1999) and recently also Teulings (2003).  
 
So while much of the early literature on what explained the increasing wage dispersion had concluded 
that this was mainly due to SBTC, more recent evidence but also simply the passage of time seem to 
question this conclusion. Instead a larger role for institutional factors and changes in these factors may 
be called for. The main problem with the hypothesis that large reductions in minimum wages caused 
the increased dispersion in the US is that although it may well explain increasing wage dispersion in 
the bottom end of the wage distribution, it is unclear why falling minimum wages affects the upper tail 
of the distribution (i.e. the 90/50 gap).  
 
A recent study for the UK by Gosling (2003) is based on data much in line with those in Figure 2a. 
The growth in high incomes (the 90th percentile) has been larger than growth in low incomes (the 10th 
percentile) but with an interesting difference between men and women. Income growth for low-
income (unskilled) women has been much larger than for men with low earnings. Also when 
controlling for education, Gosling finds that the educational premium for men has been increasing but 
not for women, in fact it seems like the male education premium is converging towards the female 
premium. This can explain why wage inequality among men has been increasing as more men have 
acquired more skills through more human capital or education while this has not been the case for 
women in the UK. However, when comparing with the US, a different picture emerges. In the US it is 
among the well-educated women that wages have been increasing most. This leads Gosling to 
conclude that there must be institutional differences in the labour market between the two countries in 
order to explain the different outcomes.  
 
Let us now move to Norway a Nordic country where there is generally more equal distribution of 
incomes as well as earnings. A recent study by Hægeland and Kirkebøen (2005) shows that very 
moderate changes in the wage dispersion have taken place in Norway since 1980. A compression of 
the wage structure took place during the 1970s but really no clear trend during the 1980s. However, 
during the 1990s and in particular during the boom in the latter half of the decade, inequality increased 
somewhat. This increase took place only at the upper half of the distribution, i.e. full time workers in 
top deciles have become relatively richer than before. During the first (and second) half of the 1980s 
the compression of the wage structure continued in the lower part of the distribution while inequality 
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increased in the upper part. These changes can be decomposed into changes in skill premiums (due to 
education and experience), changes in the distribution of these characteristics and unobserved 
characteristics and premiums. An interesting result in the study by Hægeland and Kirkebøen (2005) in 
our context is that they find no systematic change in skill premiums from 1980 to 2000. This can 
explain why there has been a moderate increase in wage inequality in Norway. There is more 
systematic evidence indicating that given existing skill premiums, education and experience have 
changed in order to produce moderately more inequality. In addition, unobserved skills and prices 
have contributed to more inequality. This result is also found in earlier studies for the US and Sweden. 
Increased within group inequality (i.e. after adjusting for gender, education, experience, sector and 
region) may indicate that wage determination have become more market oriented and less centralized 
or influenced by unions than earlier. An obvious reason for this - at least in the private sector - is that 
sectors of the Norwegian economy where unions traditionally have not been very strong have been 
expanding more than sectors that are traditionally union strongholds. Thus the very modest increase in 
wage inequality in Norway during the last 20 years is probably not much related to increased 
premiums for skills or by learning. 
 
To sum up these three country-studies they all show fairly stable educational wage premiums with the 
premium for UK men as the obvious outlier. Thus at least recent evidence point to the possibility that 
increased formal learning can take place without increased wage inequality. One reason may of course 
be that the supply of more educated people have increased sufficiently to match the increase in 
demand. In my view the argument in Card and DiNardo (2003) that technological change during the 
1990s cannot have been less than during the early 1980s, is very convincing. In the US labour 
productivity increased twice as fast during the 1990s compared to the 1980s. This was even more so in 
Norway, while in the UK productivity growth was higher during the 1980s than later. In fact, it is 
quite difficult to find any stable or systematic relationship between economic growth (which is mainly 
driven by productivity growth) and inequality cf. Banerjee and Duflo (2003) for a recent study. 
Comparing the change in earnings distribution according to figures 2a-2c with the change in labour 
productivity growth according to table 1.A1.1 in OECD (2002) between the 1980s and 1990s simply 
leaves you confused. By further comparing these changes using the data for 1970s when income 
inequality in general was on the decline in the OECD area and productivity growth generally higher 
than during the 1980s, simply adds to this confusion.  
26 
5. Summary and discussion 
From the mid 1990s (labour) productivity growth in the US increased markedly compared to previous 
decades when productivity growth was slow. In the Euro area the picture is quite the opposite with 
dismal growth more recently but rapid growth during the 1980s and early 1990s. Much of the increase 
in US growth is due to the production and use of ITC. The rapid growth of the ITC sector in the US is 
partly due to new ways of measuring output of industries producing new capital goods of higher 
quality.2 Freeman (2004) suggests that microelectronics is the key factor behind a new long wave in 
the world economy, while others are skeptical as to the effect that the ITC-revolution has on the 
overall economy, cf. Gordon (2000). Even if there is no general agreement on the size of the impact of 
ITC on the economy, there is hardly any disagreement that it has changed and is changing production 
at the firm level as well as household consumption. It makes earlier knowledge obsolete and creates 
the need for acquiring new knowledge and learning. The change in the structure of the economy with 
uneven growth in productivity between sectors also affect labour markets and may change institutions 
and systems of wage bargaining, cf. Acemoglu et al. (2001). Thus there are reasons to believe that the 
economic effects of the ITC revolution may potentially be far-reaching and widespread including 
effects on the distribution of earnings. 
 
The main empirical findings of this paper are the following.  
• There are no systematic changes in income distribution or wage dispersion among OECD-
countries during the last two decades. Some countries have experience increasing inequality 
while this is not the case for many others in particular when it comes to earnings inequality. 
There is a tendency for inequality to increase less during the 1990s than during 1980s. In some 
countries there is even falling wage inequality more recently. 
• The evidence on inequality suggests that technological change and skill-biased technological 
change in particular is only one of many factors contributing to more inequality. Institutional 
changes and differences may be more important in studying the relation between inequality 
and skills than technological change. It is difficult to find any systematic link between changes 
in inequality and productivity-growth among OECD-countries.   
• There is no correlation between wage inequality and unemployment differences across 
countries. The claim that high rates of unemployment of unskilled is caused by rigid relative 
wages needs to be modified to say the least. There is strong evidence both within and between 
                                                     
2  A seminal contribution to the methodological change in output measurement is Gordon (1990). 
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countries, that those institutional factors that influence wage bargaining - both at the national 
and firm level - also have effects on wage inequality. 
• Wage dispersion has increased less or is even absent in countries where an increasing 
proportion of the population has attained tertiary education. In many EU-countries the level of 
education is relatively low compared to most OECD-countries. Both in order to promote 
growth and avoid increasing inequalities, these countries should focus more on stimulating 
education. In this sense more learning is good both for growth, equality and social cohesion. 
 
If we relate these observations on earnings inequality to institutional differences between countries we 
may perhaps shed new light on our findings. In most Anglo-Saxon countries (US, UK, Australia, but 
not Canada) earnings inequality has increased. This phenomenon has been studied extensively and the 
standard view is that this change in distribution is mainly due to specific changes in technology. But in 
addition labour markets have been deregulated in these countries and are also characterized by high 
mobility and focus is on private ownership of knowledge. Expenditures on higher education are high 
and increasing and so is productivity. The results of this productivity growth have been individually 
appropriated and inequality has increased.  
 
In some Asian countries (Japan and South Korea) there has not been much increase in wage dispersion 
(rather the opposite). Labour markets in these countries are much influenced by large corporations and 
knowledge is more collective in nature. Thus productivity improvements are distributed to many and 
inequality has not increased.  
 
In many continental EU-countries labour markets have not been much deregulated although some 
structural reforms have been carried out. In these countries there is more focus on private-public 
partnership and strong firm linkages and strong unions where tacit knowledge are harder to remunerate 
individually. Thus there is less increase in inequality in spite of a rapid growth in labour productivity 
during the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. According to the chapter by Lorenz and Valeyre in this 
volume many of these countries also have a high share of learning organizations.  
 
Finally in most Nordic countries labour markets are still quite regulated and bargaining coordinated 
(but with some deregulation in Sweden) and there is less change in inequality (again with Sweden as 
the exception) in spite of high productivity growth.  
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So even if countries should face similar productivity shocks, their institutions vary both at the firm 
level as well as at the industry and macro-level. These institutional differences are probably important 
for explaining why the changes in productivity have been distributed so differently between countries 
during the last decades with large inequality as a result in some countries but not in others. 
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